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INTRODUCTION
ection 6928(d) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA")1 imposes criminal liability for "knowingly" storing,
treating, disposing or transporting any hazardous waste without a
permit or in violation of any existing RCRA permit condition.' The
penalty for violation of this provision is a fine of not more than
$50,000 for each day of violation and imprisonment for up to five
years.' The maximum penalty for subsequent convictions is dou-
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1. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k,
Solid Waste Disposal Act §§ 1002-11012 (1995) ("SWDA").
2. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Any person who ... (2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any
hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter -
(A) without a permit under this subchapter or pursuant to Title I of
the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (86 Stat. 1052)
[33 U.S.C. § 1411 et seq.]; or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of
such permit;
(C) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of
any applicable interim status regulations or standards ... shall, upon
conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than $50,000 for each day
of violation, or imprisonment not to exceed two years (five years in
the case of a violation of paragraph (1) or (2)), or both. If the con-
viction is for a violation committed after a first conviction of such
person under this paragraph, the maximum punishment under the
respective paragraph shall be doubled with respect to both fine and
imprisonment.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2), SWDA § 3008 (d)(2).
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bled for both the fine and imprisonment.4 Moreover, if an individu-
al violates the criminal proscriptions of RCRA, and in doing so
knowingly places another person in imminent danger, the maximum
penalty increases to $250,000 or imprisonment for up to 15 years.'
The ambiguous language of RCRA, however, has left doubt as to
what the term "knowingly" actually means. Moreover, several fed-
eral court decisions have considered whether, and in what manner,
the responsible corporate officer doctrine may be employed to
establish a knowing violation of § 6928(d).6 This Article analyzes
the level of criminal liability which the government must prove for
a "knowing" violation of the provisions of subdivision (d) of
§ 6928. Particularly, it examines whether the knowledge require-
ment is to be applied to all elements of the offense, and whether
such knowledge may be proven by reliance on the responsible
corporate officer doctrine.7
RCRA imposes a "cradle to grave" regulatory scheme designed
to protect the public and the environment. It has been recognized as
a public welfare statute designed to provide "nationwide protection
against the dangers of improper hazardous waste disposal."8 Sever-
al circuit court opinions have recognized that RCRA's purposes are
similar to that of other public welfare statutes, such as the Food
Drug and Cosmetics Act.9 It is "undeniably a public welfare stat-
4. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d), SWDA § 3008 (d).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e), SWDA § 3008 (e). For examples of prosecutions
involving these provisions, see United States v. Protex Indus., Inc., 874 F.2d 740
(10th Cir. 1989) (involving a prosecution for violation of RCRA's "knowing
endangerment" provision). Unlike § 6928(d), the special rules contained in subdi-
vision (f) expressly detail the knowledge requirement under subdivision (e). 42
U.S.C. § 6928(f).
6. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); see also United
States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975); United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 (1991).
7. United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1083 (1990); Wyckoff Co. v. EPA, 796 F.2d 1197, 1198 (9th Cir. 1986)
(holding that RCRA "was enacted to protect the national health and environ-
ment"). This article does not, however, address criminal liability under RCRA's
"knowing endangerment" provision, 42 U.S.C §§ 6928(e)-(f), SWDA §§ 3008
(e)-(f).
8. H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6249.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir.
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ute, involving a heavily regulated area with great ramifications for
the public health and safety."'" Furthermore, courts have reasoned
that the probability of regulation of this public welfare concern is
so great, those who deal with hazardous material are presumed to
be aware of its regulation."
Unlike other public welfare statutes that impose a standard of
strict liability for their violation, RCRA expressly requires a "know-
ing"' act in order to find criminal liability. RCRA prosecutions
under § 6928(d) have focused on which elements of the offense the
term "knowingly" modifies, and whether the responsible corporate
officer doctrine may be used to satisfy the knowledge requirement.
Part I of this Article considers whether knowledge of the statutory
scheme itself, knowledge of the nature of the substance, or knowl-
edge of the requirement and status of the permit of the facility in
question is necessary to establish a 'knowing' violation as defined
by RCRA. Part II of this Article will examine the responsible cor-
porate officer doctrine, and its applicability to this area of the law.
I. REQUIREMENT OF PROVING KNOWLEDGE UNDER SECTION
6928(d)
The criminal provisions of RCRA specifically require that the
government prove a knowing violation before a person may be
convicted. 3 "Knowingly", however, is not expressly defined, and
the statute's legislative history provides little insight into the con-
gressional intent. Moreover, when RCRA was amended in 1980,
Congress explained that it "ha[d] not sought to define 'knowing'
for offenses under subsection (d); that process ha[d] been left to the
courts under general principles."' 4
1986); United States v. International Min. & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971);
see also, Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994).
10. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d at 1503; see also Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038.
11. International Min. & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. at 565.
12. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 668 (3d Cir.
198-4), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985); cf. United States v. Park, 421 U.S.
658 (1975) (involving prosecutions for misdemeanor violations of the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act based on a strict liability standard).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(d)-(f), SWDA §§3008 (d)-(f).
14. H.R. REP. No. 1444, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5019, 5038. The legislative history of RCRA's criminal provisions
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The Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on the definition of
"knowingly" in regard to environmental crimes. However, in the
context of a prosecution for food stamp fraud, the Court found that
"Congress certainly intended by use of the word 'knowingly' to
require some mental state with respect to some element of the
crime .... Beyond this, the words themselves provide little guid-
ance."'
15
The criminal penalties attached to regulatory statutes intended to
protect the public health, in contrast to those statutes based on
common law crimes, are to be construed to effectuate their regula-
tory purpose. 6 As such, knowledge, under public welfare statutes
such as RCRA, must be construed in a fashion so as to effectuate
the statute's underlying regulatory purpose. This may provide for a
broader view of knowledge than in traditional areas of criminal law.
In determining the extent of this broader view, the courts have
generally looked at the conduct to be regulated, the seriousness and
extent of that conduct, and the group that Congress targeted for
punishment. 7 Within this basic framework, several cases have
examined RCRA's "knowing" requirement under § 6928(d) and
analyzed whether the requirement of knowledge applied to each
element of the offense. 8 Specifically, courts have examined
suggests that different subsections might involve different meanings of the word
"knowing". Id. The definition of "knowing" under subsection 6928(e), however,
was specifically laid out by Congress. As explained in the Conference Report:
[t]he basic definition for subsection (e) is that a person's state of mind
is 'knowing' with respect to: (A) his conduct, if he is aware of the
nature of his conduct; (B) an existing circumstance, if he is aware or
believes that the circumstance exists; or (C) a result of his conduct, if
he is aware or believes that his conduct is substantially certain to
cause danger of death or serious bodily injury.
Id.
15. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985) (emphasis added).
16. United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 49-50
(1st Cir. 1991)(citing Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 666).
17. Jane F. Barrett & Veronica M. Clarke, Perspectives on the Knowledge
Requirement of Section 6928(d) of RCRA After United States v. Dee, 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 862, 872 (1991); Rebecca S. Webber, Comment, Element Analy-
sis Applied to Environmental Crimes: What Did They Know and When Did They
Know It?, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 53, 88 (1988)(citing United States v.
Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1504 (1 1th Cir. 1986)).
18. See United States v. International Min. & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558
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whether the government must prove the defendant's knowledge of:
(a) the existence of the RCRA statute; (b) the nature of the sub-
stance involved in the treatment, disposal, storage or transportation;
and (c) the lack of a permit or the facility's permit status. Several
of these cases have also examined how the defendant's knowledge
may be established and whether the "responsible corporate officer"
doctrine may be used to attribute knowledge to individual defen-
dants. 19
A. Knowledge of the RCRA Statutory Scheme
The defendant need not have knowledge of the existence of the
RCRA statutory scheme, nor that he is violating RCRA, in order to
be convicted under § 6928(d). Courts have consistently held that
"ignorance of the law is no excuse" and a defendant's lack of
knowledge of the regulations, or his misunderstanding of them, is
irrelevant. 20 In United States v. International Minerals & Chemical
Corp.,2' the Supreme Court held that "where... dangerous or
deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials are
involved, the probability of regulation is so great that anyone who
is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with them must
be presumed to be aware of the regulation. 22 In United States v.
Hayes International Corp.,2 3 the Eleventh Circuit held that knowl-
edge of the statute, or knowledge of illegality, is an element of the
offense. 24 However, because the statute was undeniably a public
welfare statute involving a heavily regulated area which impacted
on public health and safety, it was reasonable to charge those who
(1971); see also United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990); Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662.
19. See United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 919 (1991); see also United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.,
933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 773 (1996).
20. United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 538 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 773 (1996) (citing International Min. & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. at
563); Dee, 912 F.2d at 745; Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033; United States v. Hayes Int'l
Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1502-03 (11th Cir. 1986).
21. 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
22. Id. at 565.
23. 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986).
24. Id. at 1504.
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operated within such an area with knowledge of its regulatory pro-
visions."
B. Knowledge of the Nature of the Substance
The circuit courts are in general agreement that the "knowingly"
reference requires the government to prove that the defendant knew
that the material involved was hazardous.2 6 The defendant, howev-
er, need not know that the substance was included under the statu-
tory scheme or regulations as a "listed" or "characteristic" RCRA
waste. Rather, it is sufficient to prove that the defendant knew the
substance involved had the potential to harm people or the environ-
ment and was not an innocuous substance such as water."
For example, in United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc., the
Fifth Circuit determined that "knowingly" meant the defendant
knew that the nature of the material involved had potential for harm
to others or to the environment. 9 Thus, while the government
must establish the defendant had knowledge that the substance was
hazardous or harmful in order to convict under § 6928(d), the gov-
ernment is not required to prove that the defendant knew the sub-
stance had been identified as a listed or characteristic hazardous
waste.30
C. Knowledge of Permit Requirement & Permit Status
Unlike other sections of RCRA, § 6928(d)(2)(A) does not include
an explicit requirement that the violation is committed knowing-
ly. 3' As such, the circuits are split regarding whether knowledge of
25. Id. at 1504-05.
26. Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1039. This view regarding knowledge of the nature of
the substance was also adopted in United States v. Greer, 850 F.2d 1447, 1452
(11th Cir. 1988).
27. Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1039.
28. 934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1991).
29. Id. In Baytank, the Fifth Circuit recognized that a majority of the circuits
have adopted the view that "knowingly", as used in RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d),
SWDA § 3008(d), applies to knowledge that the substance has potential to harm
others or the environment. Id. at 613.
30. Id. at 612.
31. Subsection 2 requires knowing treatment, storage, or disposal, 42 U.S.C.
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the permit requirement, and knowledge of the status of the requisite
permit, are a part of the criminal proscriptions of RCRA.
In United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc.,32 the government
charged the corporation and two of its employees with "knowingly"
disposing of hazardous waste without a permit.33 The lower court
dismissed the RCRA counts of the indictment against the two em-
ployees because they were not "owners/operators" under RCRA,
and thus, had no obligation under the statute to obtain a permit.
34
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and held that,
regardless of the defendant's position within the company, the two
employees could be subject to prosecution under § 6928(d).35
The government in Johnson & Towers argued that it need only
prove that there was, in fact, no permit for the disposal or treatment
of the hazardous waste involved, and not that the defendants knew
a permit was lacking. 36 The term "knowingly", the government
argued, applied only to the "treatment", "storage" or "disposal" of a
hazardous waste and not to the permit requirement of
§ 6928(d)(2)(A).37 The court disagreed with this position and held
§ 6928(d)(2), SWDA § 3008 (d)(2), and subsections (2)(B) and (2)(C) include
references to "knowing violations", 42 U.S.C §§ 6928(d)(2)(B)-(C), SWDA
§§ 3008 (d)(2)(B)-(C), but subsection (2)(A) does not mention knowledge.
:32. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). The
defendant corporation was engaged in the business of repairing and overhauling
large motor vehicles. Id. at 663. The employee defendants, the plant foreman and
a service manager, were charged with one count of conspiracy, one count of
violating the Clean Water Act, and three RCRA counts. Id. at 664. The RCRA
counts stemmed from the disposal of waste de-greasing chemicals which were
first stored in a tank and then pumped into a trench that discharged into the Dela-
ware River. Id.
:33. Id.
:34. Id.
:35. Id.
:36. Id. at 665.
:37. Id. at 667. Section 6928(d)(2) refers to "knowingly treats, stores, or dis-
poses of any hazardous waste", 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2), SWDA § 3008 (d) (2),
but the section in question in Johnson & Towers, § 6928(d)(2)(A), does not spe-
cifically mention knowledge. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A), SWDA § 3008
(d)(2)(A).
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that the knowledge requirement applied to all elements of the of-
fense.38 The court explained that:
It is unlikely that Congress could have intended to subject to crim-
inal prosecution those persons who acted when no permit had been
obtained irrespective of their knowledge (under subsection (A)),
but not those persons who acted in violation of the terms of a per-
mit unless that action was knowing (subsection (B)). Thus we are
led to conclude either that the omission of the word "knowing" in
(A) was inadvertent or that "knowingly" which introduces subsec-
tion (2) applies to subsection (A).39
The Third Circuit concluded, therefore, that the term "knowing-
ly" modified all elements of the offense and that the government
was required to prove knowledge of the disposal, knowledge that
the material disposed was hazardous, and knowledge of the non-
permit status of the disposal site.'
The court went on to explain that knowledge could be shown
by the defendant's knowledge of actions taken, and that the gov-
ernment need not prove knowledge of the existence of the statute
forbidding such actions.41 Although such knowledge could be
inferred circumstantially, the court indicated that knowledge could
not be irrebuttably presumed based on corporate position alone or
facts unrelated to the specific illegal activity charged.42
Similarly, in United States v. Hayes International Corp.,43 the
Eleventh Circuit reviewed RCRA's legislative history and deter-
mined that Congress intended the "knowing" requirement to
apply to all elements of the RCRA offense." The court decided
38. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 667.
39. Id. at 668.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 669 (citing United States v. International Min. & Chem. Corp., 402
U.S. 558, 563 (1971)).
42. Id.; see United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d
35, 54 n.18 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that in Johnson & Towers the court did not
indicate how knowledge of the law might be inferred).
43. 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986). Hayes involved felony RCRA charges
against an airplane refurbishing plant and a company with which the operator had
contracted for waste disposal. Id. at 1500-01. Fuel drained from the tanks of
planes, and paints and solvents used on the planes, were illegally disposed of by
the contractor. Id. at 1500.
44. Id. at 1503-04.
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that without this stringent culpability requirement, innocent con-
duct would be criminalized contrary to congressional intent.45
Although the court rejected the defendant's claim that lack of
knowledge of the illegality of the offense was a defense, it found
that the "knowingly" standard of culpability did apply to all ele-
ments of the statute, and therefore, proof of the defendant's
knowledge of the permit status of a waste disposal facility to
which the waste was transported was a necessary requirement for
conviction under § 6928(d).'
The holdings in Johnson & Towers and Hayes may be contrast-
ed with the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Hoflin.47
Hoflin involved an appeal from a felony conviction for aiding and
abetting the disposal of hazardous waste in violation of
§ 6928(d)(2)(A), which occurred during defendant's tenure as the
director of public works for a municipality in Washington.'4 The
defendant argued that in order for his conviction to stand, there
had to be proof that he knew the disposal site where the hazard-
ous waste was taken did not have a permit, and that in its instruc-
tions to the jury the court failed to charge this as an element of
the offense.49
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the defendant's conviction, holding
that knowledge of the non-existence of a permit was not neces-
sary for a conviction under § 6928(d)(2)(A), and that the govern-
ment need only prove that the defendant knew that the substance
disposed of was hazardous.5" The court held that knowledge of
the lack of a permit was not an element of the offense since the
statute clearly distinguished between non-permit holders, and
permit holders.5 The court noted that the absence of the word
"knowing" in subsection (A) of § 6928(d)(2) (relating to the
absence of a permit), was in contrast to its presence in subsection
(B) (relating to a violation of a material condition or requirement
of an existing permit) and that "to read the word 'knowingly' at
4.5. Id. at 1504; see also Webber, supra note 17, at 89.
46. Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1504.
47. 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990).
48. Id. at 1034.
49. Id. at 1036-51.
50. Id. at 1038.
51. Id. at 1037.
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the beginning of section (2) into subsection (A) would be to evis-
cerate this distinction.,1
2
The court in Hoflin declined to follow the Third Circuit's anal-
ysis in-Johnson & Towers for two reasons. First, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found that under the plain meaning of the statute, "knowing-
ly" did not modify the phrase "without a permit."53 Secondly,
the Ninth Circuit viewed the analysis of Johnson & Towers as
being inconsistent with the purpose and goals of RCRA as a
public welfare statute.54
The Ninth Circuit reversed its ground, however, in United
States v. Speach." In Speach, the Ninth Circuit held that proof
of the defendant's knowledge that the facility to which he trans-
ported hazardous waste lacked an appropriate RCRA permit was
an element of the crime under § 6928(d)(1).56 The court relied
on the fact that the two cases involved different subdivisions of
§ 6928, and therefore, the court was not bound by its earlier deci-
sion in Hoflin.5 7 Rather, the court in Speach relied on the Elev-
enth Circuit's decision in United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp.,"
and found that "knowingly" applied not only to the nature of the
hazardous material, but to whether the facility had the requisite
permit.5 9 The dissent in Speach, however, believed that it was
bound by its earlier decision in Hoflin, since § 6928(d)(1) had the
same scienter requirement as did §§ 6928(d)(2)(A) & (B), which
the Hoflin court examined.'
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1038.
54. Id.
55. 968 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1992).
56. Id. at 797.
57. Id.
58. 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986).
59. Speach, 968 F.2d at 797.
60. Id. at 798.
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The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Dee,6 also declined to
follow Johnson & Towers and accepted the analysis employed by
the Hoflin court. Dee held that in a RCRA prosecution under
§ 6928(d)(2)(A), the government need not prove either the
defendant's knowledge of the permit status of the facility or
knowledge that RCRA requires treatment, disposal, and storage
facilities to be permitted.62
Most recently, in United States v. Hopkins,63 the Second Cir-
cuit applied the International Minerals "presumption of aware-
ness of regulation" theory by applying the knowledge requirement
of RCRA to violations of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). 64 Re-
lying on the analysis in United States v. Laughlin,65 and other
circuit court decisions interpreting RCRA criminal penalties, the
Hopkins court concluded that Congress intended to impose crimi-
nal liability under the CWA "if the defendant's acts were pro-
scribed, even if the defendant was not aware of the proscrip-
tion." The court based its decision to impose criminal penalties
for "knowing" ground pollution and water pollution offenses, on
the similarity of the underlying Congressional intent in both
61. 912 F.2d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 (1991). The
defendants in Dee were civil engineers for the United States Army, charged with
violations of RCRA for illegally storing, treating, and disposing of hazardous
waste generated during the development of chemical warfare systems at a site not
covered by a RCRA permit. Id. at 743.
62. Id.; see Barrett & Clarke, supra note 17, at 878. Similarly, in United
States v. Laughlin, the court, following Hoflin, found that the government need
not prove defendants knew the facility lacked a permit, and held that Johnson &
Towers had been incorrectly decided. 768 F. Supp. 957, 961-66 (N.D.N.Y. 1991).
63. 53 F.3d 533 (2d Cir. 1995).
64. Id. at 538-39; Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387, CWA §§ 101-
607 (1994).
65. 10 F.3d 961 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 1649
(1994). In Laughlin, the court held that under RCRA "knowing" does not require
the defendant to have knowledge of the statute, but simply knowledge of the act.
Id. at 966-67.
66. Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 540. The Ninth Circuit, in United States v.
Weitzenhoff, similarly held that the government did not have to prove the
defendant's knowledge of the provisions of the permit under the CWA, but need
only prove that the defendant knew he was discharging pollutants. 35 F.3d 1275,
1280 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, U.S. , 115 S. Ct. 939 (1995).
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RCRA and CWA.67 Thus, the government need only prove that
the defendant "knew the nature of [the] acts and performed them
intentionally, but was not required to prove that he knew that
those acts violated the CWA, or any particular provision of that
law, or the regulatory permit issued .... "6
Although there remains some dispute as to the need to prove
the defendant's knowledge of the permit status or conditions
contained in the RCRA permit, it is clear that with respect to the
nature of the material being treated, stored or disposed of, the
government must prove a defendant's knowledge of the general
hazardous nature of the material, but need not establish knowl-
edge that the material was either a listed or characteristic hazard-
ous waste under RCRA.69 The government must show, either by
direct or circumstantial evidence, only that the defendant knew
the material had the potential to be harmful to people or the
environment.0 The government need not prove defendant's
knowledge of the existence of the RCRA regulatory scheme, or
that his or her actions were subject to RCRA.71
II. THE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER DOCTRINE AND
RCRA
In addition to examining which elements of RCRA require
proof of knowledge, RCRA prosecutions also continue to focus
on how the government can prove knowledge against officers of
the corporation. Courts have looked not only at the direct or
actual knowledge which the individual defendant possesses, but
the knowledge that may be inferred based on his or her corporate
position within the company.72
Under the responsible corporate officer doctrine, a corporate
officer may be held criminally liable if, by virtue of his or her
position and authority within the company, the defendant had the
67. Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 538-39.
68. Id. at 541.
69. United States v. Self, 2 F.3d 1071, 1091 (10th Cir. 1993).
70. Id.
71. Id.; United States v. Goldsmith, 978 F.2d 643, 645 (11 th Cir. 1992); Unit-
ed States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187, 191 (6th Cir. 1992).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 919 (1991).
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power to prevent or correct the conduct which gave rise to the
violation.73 This liability may attach even though the officer did
not .personally participate in the commission of the offense.74
The responsible corporate officer theory of liability was initial-
ly articulated in United States v. Dotterweich,75 which involved
the prosecution of the president of a company under the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA").76 It is based on the
premise that high level executive officers are responsible for the
corporation's actions and inactions by virtue of their position or
authority. With regard to public welfare statutes, such as the
FDCA, therefore, application of the doctrine places an affirmative
duty upon the corporate hierarchy to seek out and remedy viola-
tions of such statutes.77 Criminal liability may be imposed if the
responsible corporate officer "knew or should have known" of the
corporation's criminal conduct, even if he or she did not express-
ly authorize or direct their subordinates to perform such con-
duct.7"
The rationale underlying the doctrine is to protect the "innocent
public who are wholly helpless."79 There is a difference, howev-
er, between public welfare statutes such as those involved in
Dotterweich and Park, where there was a strict liability standard,
and RCRA, where the statute expressly requires proof that the
officer "knowingly" committed the offense. Prosecutors have
'73. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); see also United
States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
"74. See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281.
'75. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
'76. Id. at 279; see also Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301-395 (1994).
'77. Park, 421 U.S. at 670-73. In Park, a corporate president located in Phila-
delphia, Pennsylvania was convicted of violating the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA) because of contaminated food stored in a warehouse in
Baltimore, Maryland. Id. at 658-59. The Supreme Court noted that the "Govern-
ment establishe[d] a prima facie case when it introduce[d] evidence sufficient to
warrant a finding by the trier of the facts that the defendant had, by reason of his
position in the corporation, responsibility and authority either to prevent in the
first instance, or promptly to correct, the violation complained of, and that he
failed to do so." Id. at 673-74.
78. Id. at 671.
79. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285.
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nonetheless argued that the responsible corporate officer doctrine
may be applied to hold corporate officers accountable for crimes
that endanger the public welfare without abandoning the knowl-
edge requirement of RCRA. 0 Indeed, although Johnson & Tow-
ers did not deal with the application of the responsible corporate
officer doctrine, the court did suggest in dicta that "knowl-
edge ... may be inferred by the jury as to those individuals who
hold the requisite responsible positions with the corporate defen-
dant."'" Courts have held that knowledge may be inferred from
the surrounding facts and circumstances, including: (1) the
officer's area of responsibility and control over the RCRA activi-
ty involved; (2) whether the officer had the power and authority
to prevent or correct the violation; and (3) whether the officer
knowingly failed to do so. 2
The government has sought to use the responsible corporate
officer doctrine in several RCRA prosecutions. In United States v.
Dee,83 two high level corporate managers who did not have
"hands on" responsibility for the RCRA activities involved were,
nevertheless, convicted based on the court's instructions to the
jury which permitted them to infer knowledge relying on the
responsible corporate officer doctrine. 4 The jury was instructed,
in part, as follows:
Among the circumstances you may consider in deter-
mining the defendants' knowledge are their responsibil-
ities under the regulations and under any applicable
policies. Thus you may, but need not, infer that a de-
fendant knew facts which you find that they should
have known given their positions in the organization,
their relationship to other employees, or any applicable
policies or regulation. 5
The application of the responsible corporate officer doctrine
under Dee still requires the government to prove that the corpo-
rate officers had actual knowledge of the pre-existing RCRA
80. Barrett & Clarke, supra note 17, at 883.
81. 741 F.2d 662, 670 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
82. Barrett & Clarke, supra note 17, at 884.
83. 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 (1991).
84. Id. at 745.
85. Barrett & Clarke, supra note 17, at 885 n.125.
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violations and knowingly failed to take actions to correct these
violations where they had the power and authority to do so.86
Prosecutors argue that the use of the responsible corporate officer
doctrine does not negate the knowing requirement under
§ 6928(d) of RCRA, but rather, permits the jury to consider the
defendants' managerial responsibility to determine if the defen-
dants "knowingly" acted or "knowingly" failed to act to prevent
the RCRA violations. According to this view, RCRA convictions
of' corporate officers are based on more than the defendant's
official position which he or she held within the company. 7
The government's application of the responsible corporate
officer doctrine in Dee has been criticized by several members of
the defense bar.88 They claim that the doctrine has been expand-
ed past its traditional use in strict liability offenses and has obvi-
ated the element of knowledge which Congress wrote into the
RCRA criminal provision.89 They point out that, unlike the lan-
guage that appears in the Clean Water Act,' RCRA has no re-
sponsible corporate officer language. Those opposing the applica-
tion of the responsible corporate officer doctrine to RCRA offens-
es claim that it imposes a strict liability standard that was never
intended, and thereby shifts the burden of proof.91
Since Dee, the government has continued to argue for applica-
tion of the responsible corporate officer doctrine. United States v.
MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.,92 involved two shipments
of toluene-contaminated soil to a facility which was not autho-
86. Dee, 912 F.2d at 745.
87. Barrett & Clarke, supra note 17, at 885 n.127.
88. See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, Moral Qualms about Environmental Prosecu-
tions, N.Y.L.J., July 11, 1991, at 3; Stanley S. Arkin, Crime Against the Environ-
ment, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 9, 1990, at 3.
89. See Rakoff, supra note 88; see also Arkin, supra note 88; Alan Zarky,
The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, 5 Toxic L. Rept. (BNA) 983 (Jan.
9, 1991). See generally Barrett & Clarke, supra note 17, at 881 n.111.
90. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6), FWPCA § 309 (c)(6), (1994) (the term "person"
under the statute means "any responsible corporate officer").
91. Keith A. Onsdorff & James M. Mesnard, The Responsible Corporate
Officer Doctrine in RCRA Criminal Enforcement: What You Don't Know Can
Hurt You, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10099, 10100 (Feb. 1992).
92. 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
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rized under its permit to dispose of that specific type of hazard-
ous waste.93 During the trial, the government acknowledged that
there was no evidence that defendant D'Allesandro, the president
of the company, actually knew of the RCRA violations.94 Basing
its theory of criminal liability on the responsible corporate officer
doctrine, the government argued that the defendant could be
convicted of the RCRA felony if he knew or should have known
of the two waste shipments made in violation of § 6928(d).95
The trial court accepted the government's position and instructed
the jury that RCRA's knowledge requirement would be met if the
jury found that: (1) the defendant was an officer of the corpora-
tion; (2) the defendant had direct responsibility for the alleged
illegal activities; and (3) the defendant knew or believed that
illegal activity of the type charged had occurred.96 The defendant
was convicted despite his claim that use of the responsible corpo-
rate officer doctrine was improper under RCRA § 6928(d) be-
cause that provision expressly provided for proof of knowl-
edge.97
On appeal, the First Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction,
holding that the jury instructions permitted a finding of guilt
without a finding of actual knowledge of the two shipments in
question.98 Thus, the Court held that merely proving that the de-
fendant was a responsible corporate officer was insufficient to
establish the required "knowledge" for a conviction under
§ 6928(d), and any presumption of knowledge based solely on the
corporate officer's position was error.99 The jury instruction was
found to be erroneous because it suggested that a corporate offi-
93. Id. at 39-40.
94. Id. at 50. Evidence indicated that MacDonald & Watson was a relatively
small company and that the defendant exercised "hands on" management respon-
sibilities. Id. There was no evidence that defendant D'Allesandro knew of the two
improper shipments which were charged in the indictment, but the evidence did
indicate that he had been advised of two previous shipments which were improp-
er. Id. at 42.
95. Id. at 50.
96. Id. at 50-51.
97. Id. at 51.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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cial could be convicted of a knowing violation under RCRA
simply because he failed to ensure proper compliance with the
statute."° The Court did imply, however, that had the jury been
instructed that it could infer knowledge of the illegal shipments
based on circumstantial evidence produced at trial, the
defendant's conviction could have been upheld.''
The court in MacDonald & Watson distinguished both
Dotterweich and Park."2 It found that those two cases reflected
the: well-established law relating to public welfare statutes which
lack an express knowledge or other requirement of scienter 3
However, because § 6928(d) of RCRA contains an express re-
quirement of knowledge, the court concluded that the responsible
corporate officer doctrine could not be employed in the same
fashion."l Knowledge on the part of a corporate official could
be proven or inferred by circumstantial evidence, but it could not,
as was done by the jury in MacDonald & Watson, be inferred
merely by proof that the defendant was a responsible corporate
officer. 5
The court in MacDonald & Watson went on to hold that:
[K]nowledge may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, includ-
ing position and responsibility of defendants such as corporate
officers, as well as information provided to those defendants on
prior occasions .... [But] [iun a crime having knowledge as an ex-
press element, a mere showing of official responsibility under
Dotterweich and Park is not an adequate substitute for direct or
circumstantial proof of knowledge."
The government again attempted to apply the responsible cor-
porate officer doctrine in United States v. White."0 7 Defendant
100. Id. at 51.
1011. Id. at 54-55.
102. Id. at 51.
103. Id. at 51-52.
104. Id. at 52.
105. Id. at 51-52.
106. Id. at 55. Additionally, the court held that "[W]illful blindness to the facts
constituting the offense may be sufficient to establish knowledge." Id.
107. 766 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Wash. 1991). The case involved the indictment of
five individuals for alleged illegal storage, transportation, and disposal of hazard-
ous waste under 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(d) & (e), SWDA §§ 3008 (d) & (e), and
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Steed, the company's corporate officer for environmental safety,
was charged with the acts of all employees of the PureGro facili-
ty on the theory that even if he did not actually know of these
activities, under the analysis employed in Dotterweich and Park,
he should have known of them. °8
The court in White noted, however, that Dotterweich and Park
involved strict liability crimes under the FDCA and that no mens
rea was required under the relevant statute."° The court also
treated as dicta the language in Johnson & Towers,"' in which
the court suggested that knowledge of the permit requirement
could be inferred to the company's responsible corporate offi-
cers."' The court in White concluded that under RCRA
§ 6928(d), the government must prove "knowing" treatment,
storage or disposal, as well as knowledge that the waste was
hazardous." 2 The court refused to adopt the responsible corpo-
rate officer doctrine to support a criminal conviction without the
government first establishing a "knowing" state of mind on the
part of the defendant corporate officer."3
Although the government did not explicitly argue for the appli-
cation of the responsible corporate officer doctrine, as it did in
MacDonald & Watson and White, it did argue that the holding in
Baytank"4 applied. The Fifth Circuit implicitly accepted the use
of the responsible corporate officer doctrine when it reinstated the
jury's conviction of two individuals based upon their familiarity
with the company's operations and their involvement with the
certain violations of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7
U.S.C. §§ 136-136(y) (1992). White, 766 F. Supp. at 877. The charges centered
around the defendants' facility, PureGro, where from 1982 through 1987, an
evaporator tank was used as a repository for various types of pesticide rinseates.
Id. No records were maintained by the company of what was put into the tank.
Id. In 1987, the material from the tank was loaded into a truck and sprayed on a
field. Id.
108. Id. at 894.
109. Id. at 894-95.
110. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. .denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
111. White, 766 F. Supp. at 895.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1991).
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company's environmental compliance efforts."5 The Baytank
court held that "[gliven the evidence of their detailed knowledge
of and control over the storage operations at Baytank, the jury
was entitled to conclude that they participated in the illegal stor-
age charged ... .6
Recently, in United States v. Self,"7 the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed the conviction of an owner/operations manager of a
RCRA permitted facility for knowingly storing hazardous waste
in violation of the facility's RCRA permit."' Relying on
MacDonald & Watson,"9 the defendant contended that knowl-
edge by a responsible corporate officer of the prior illegal trans-
portation of hazardous waste did not necessarily constitute knowl-
edge of the RCRA violation charged in the indictment.' The
Court noted, however, that MacDonald & Watson held that an
individual's position within the corporation would not, in itself,
be sufficient to establish his or her knowledge of the RCRA
violation, but such knowledge could be inferred from circumstan-
tial evidence, including evidence of the defendant's position and
responsibility within the corporation, as well as knowledge of any
prior violations.''
The Court in Self sustained the defendant's conviction, finding
that the defendant's corporate position included directing compa-
ny employees to store hazardous waste and overseeing bills relat-
ing to the handling of the company's hazardous waste. The court
also found that the defendant had direct knowledge of prior ille-
gal. storage and knowledge that such storage violated the
company's RCRA permit.' Further, the Court affirmed the
conviction under this count based on the alternative theory that
115. See id. at 616-17.
116. Id. at 617.
117. 2 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 1993).
118. Id. at 1094.
119. 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
120. Self, 2 F.3d at 1088.
12:1. Id. (quoting MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 55)("IKlnowledge may be
inferred from circumstantial evidence, including the position and responsibility of
defendants ... as well as information provided to those defendants on prior occa-
sions.").
122. Id.
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the defendant, acting as a co-conspirator, had aided and abetted in
the commission of the offense.'23
Although the government's attempts to apply the responsible
corporate officer doctrine to RCRA have not been wholly suc-
cessful, there are indications that corporate officers may still be
held liable under RCRA for a "knowing" violation of § 6928(d)
in those cases where there is evidence to infer their knowledge.
While proof of "knowledge" must be shown, and will depend
upon the individual facts and circumstances of each case, such
knowledge may be proven circumstantially, relying on the posi-
tion of the individual defendant and the duties and responsibilities
he or she maintained. Prosecutors must keep in mind that merely
demonstrating the position of a particular officer within the cor-
porate hierarchy will not, in itself, impose criminal liability under
RCRA. The courts are unwilling to apply the responsible corpo-
rate officer doctrine in such a manner to permit an individual's
position and duties within a corporation to serve as the sole basis
to attribute guilty knowledge under RCRA.
III. CONCLUSION
In the area of environmental crimes, the courts seem to be
balancing the requirement of knowledge against the strong public
policy interests underlying environmental protection statutes. The
knowledge requirement under § 6928(d) of RCRA has been inter-
preted by the federal courts to effectuate the public welfare pur-
poses at which RCRA is aimed. Specific knowledge of the regu-
latory scheme, or knowledge that such actions were unlawful,
need not be proven. Nevertheless, the courts have held that the
"knowing" requirement under RCRA § 6928(d) requires that the
government prove that a defendant had knowledge of his or her
own actions and knew that the material transported, stored or
disposed of was hazardous to the environment. Furthermore,
although the courts are unwilling to find that corporate officers
possess the requisite knowledge for conviction under § 6928(d) of
RCRA merely because of their position within the corporate
hierarchy, it is clear that corporate managers can no longer insu-
late themselves from criminal liability by delegating their respon-
123. Id. at 1088-89.
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sibitlity for compliance to others or by closing their eyes to the
problem.

